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AbstrAct
This paper presents an analysis of weak deinites (e.g. to answer the phone) 
as introduced by Carlson and Sussman (2005). The proposal is that these 
deinites refer to kinds, which are instantiated by ordinary individuals when 
they combine with object-level predicates. This combination is made possible 
by a lexical rule that lifts object-level predicates to kind-level predicates, and 
incorporates into their denotation a predicate that represents the stereotypical 
usages of the kinds. This analysis accounts for most of the peculiar properties 
of weak deinites.
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1. introduction
Weak deinites, like to answer the phone, to take the train and to go 
to the hospital, are deinites that do not refer to uniquely identiiable indivi-
duals (Carlson and Sussman 2005). Consequently, they felicitously describe 
contexts in which more than one entity satisies their descriptive content. For 
example, sentence (1) is an accurate summary of a situation in which Lola 
traveled by train from Amsterdam to Nijmegen and made a transfer halfway 
(i.e. she took two trains, one from Amsterdam to Utrecht and another one from 
Utrecht from Nijmegen):
(1) Lola took the train from Amsterdam to Nijmegen.
Another consequence of the lack of uniqueness is that weak deinites (2a), in 
contrast to regular deinites (2b), display sloppy identity in elliptical contexts. 
From now on, we use the symbol # to indicate when a deinite does not receive 
any weak reading:
(2) a. Lola went to the hospital and Alice did too.
  (Lola and Alice could have gone to different hospitals)
 b. Lola went to #the hotel and Alice did too.
  (Lola and Alice must have gone to the same hotel)
In addition to non-unique reference and sloppy identity, weak deinites dis-
play the following special properties (also originally described by Carlson and 
Sussman 2005). First, they receive ‘narrow scope’ interpretations when they 
interact with quantiied expressions:
(3) a. Every boxer was sent to the hospital.
  (Each boxer could have been sent to a different hospital)
 b. Every boxer was sent to #the hotel.
  (All the boxers were sent to the same hotel)
Second, weak deinites display lexical restrictions: not every noun can occur 
in a weak deinite coniguration (4) and not every verb can govern a weak 
deinite (5).
(4) a. Martha listened to the radio.
 b. Martha listened to #the walkie talkie.
(5) a. Martha listened to the radio.
 b. Martha ixed #the radio.
Weak deinites also display restrictions on modiication. Typically, the weak 
reading disappears if the nouns are modiied (6a). Only a few adjectives esta-
blishing subtypes of objects are acceptable (6b).
(6) a. Lola went to #the old hospital.
 b. Lola went to the psychiatric hospital.
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Weak deinites typically occur in the object position of verbs and prepositions 
(7). When the same deinites occur as subjects of episodic sentences, they can 
only be interpreted as speciic deinites (8):
(7)  Martha was sent to the hospital.
(8) # The hospital was closed today.
In contrast, the same deinites that can be interpreted as weak deinites in ap-
propriate conigurations can also occur in generic sentences:
(9)  The hospital is where you go to get healthy.
There are a few other similarities between weak and generic interpretations of 
deinites. For example, generic deinites also do not accept modiication (10) 
unless they are modiied by adjectives that create subclasses of objects (11):
(10) ?? The old hospital is where you go to get healthy.
(11)  The public hospital is where you go to get healthy.
On the other hand, in contrast to sentences with generic deinites, sentences 
containing weak deinites typically display enriched meanings, that is to say, 
they carry more information than what is conveyed by the straightforward 
composition of their constituents:
(12) Eva called the doctor = Eva called a doctor + she asked for medical assistance.
Weak deinites seem to be defective with respect to discourse reference. This 
is relected in the questionable acceptability of weak deinites as antecedents 
of anaphoric expressions:
(13) Lola listened to the radio
i
 until she fell asleep. ?She turned it
i
 off when she woke 
up in the middle of the night.
Finally, weak deinites are in complementary distribution with the type of bare 
singular nominals illustrated as follows (Stvan 1998, 2009):
(14) a. The ship is at sea/port.
 b. He’s in bed/jail/prison/church.
 c. I watched television this weekend.
These nominals (hereafter bare singulars) display most of the properties of 
weak deinites. They display sloppy identity in VP-ellipsis sentences (15) and 
narrow scope interpretations in quantiied sentences (16). Also, not every noun 
can occur bare (17), and not every predicate can govern a bare singular (18). 
Likewise, modiication turns bare singulars ungrammatical (19a), although 
some modiiers creating subclasses of objects are allowed (19b). Bare singu-
lars in subject position of episodic sentences are typically not acceptable (20). 
As subjects of generic sentences they are possible (21), although restricted. 
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Bare singulars do not serve as good antecedents for anaphoric expressions 
(22). Finally, sentences with bare singulars display meaning enrichments (23).
(15)   Alice is in jail and Lola too.
   (Alice and Lola could be in different jails)
(16)   Every boxer is in jail.
   (Each boxer could be in a different jail)
(17)  * Alice is in cage.
(18)  * Alice is behind prison.
(19) a. * Alice is in old prison.
 b.  Alice is in military prison.
(20)  * Jail was full last year.
(21)   Jail is not a nice place to be for a young woman.
(22)  ?? Alice is in jail
i
 but she thinks that it
i
 will be demolished soon.
(23)   Alice is in jail.  = Alice is in a jail + she is imprisoned.
There are at least three good reasons why weak deinites deserve to be stu-
died. First, they challenge the well-established assumption that deinites refer 
uniquely. Second, their special properties constitute an intriguing puzzle from 
a semantic point of view, in the way compositional, lexical, and pragmatic 
factors come together. Finally, as the properties of weak deinites are also dis-
played by bare singulars, the study of weak deinites also beneits the under-
standing of these other constructions. 
The present paper presents an analysis of weak deinites that aims to 
account for the peculiarities listed above. This is an elaborated version of the 
account presented in Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts (2011), which is the back-
bone of Aguilar-Guevara (2013). 1 The proposal in a nutshell is that weak dei-
nites refer to kinds instantiated by objects when they combine with object-
level predicates. The combination is made possible by a lexical rule that lifts 
object-level predicates to kind-level predicates, ensures that the kinds are in-
stantiated via Carlson’s (1977) realization relation, and incorporates into the 
denotation of the lifted versions a relation that corresponds to the stereotypical 
usages of the kinds.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 spells out the semantics 
we adopt for the deinite article present in weak deinites. Section 3 discusses 
how weak deinites make reference to kinds. Section 4 discusses how the kinds 
denoted by weak deinites are instantiated, which allows for the formulation 
of logical forms of sentences with weak deinites in Section 5. Then, Section 6 
1.  As from Carlson and Sussman’s (2005) work, weak deinites have received signii-
cant attention. We refer the reader to works like Carlson et al. (2006); Bosch (2010); Bosch 
and Cieschinger (2010); Aguilar-Guevara and Schulpen (2011); Klein (2011); Schulpen 
(2011); Zribi-Hertz and Jean-Louis (2012); Aguilar-Guevara and Schulpen (to appear); Asic 
and Corblin (to appear); Schwarz (to appear); Zwarts (to appear).
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discusses stereotypical usages of kinds and how they are captured in the logical 
form of weak deinite sentences. Section 7 discusses how the combination of 
weak deinites with object-level predicates takes place. Section 8 summarizes 
the main claims and discusses the virtues of this analysis as well as its dis-
advantages and some other open questions.
2. The meaning of the deinite article
There exist two main lines of thought accounting for the meaning of 
deinites. One line, initiated by Frege (1892); Russell (1905) and Strawson 
(1950), and followed by contemporary authors like Hawkins (1991); Abbott 
(1999) and partially by Farkas (2002) and Schwarz (2009) can be summarized 
in the following condition:
(24) Uniqueness condition
 A deinite is felicitous if there is one and only one entity in the context that 
satisies its descriptive content. 
The other line of thought, proposed by Heim (1982); Kamp (1981), and par-
tially followed by authors like Roberts (2003) and Schwarz (2009) can be sum-
marized in the following condition:
(25) Familiarity condition
 A deinite is felicitous only if the existence of its referent is presumably known 
by the hearer.
Most of the contemporary approaches to deinites opt for either uniqueness or 
familiarity (see references above). However, more recently, some authors have 
pursued a combination of both approaches (e.g. Farkas 2002; Roberts 2003) 
and some others have adopted both to account for different uses of deinites 
(e.g. Schwarz 2009).
Contributing to an evaluation of these approaches is not one of the aims 
of this paper. Instead, we simply assume that the deinite article present in 
weak deinites is the same one occurring in at least a great range of regular 
deinites, and that it encodes uniqueness. 2
2. Notice that Russell’s analysis only concerns deinite phrases containing singular 
countable nouns. Hawkins (1978) subsumed the notion of uniqueness under maximality (also 
called inclusiveness or exhaustiveness) to account for deinite phrases with mass and plural 
nouns as well. The idea of inclusiveness is that the denotation of a deinite consists of eve-
rything meeting the conditions of the descriptive content of the NP, viz., the maximal set of 
objects or the totality of mass which satisies the deinite description. According to this, a 
phrase like the cardinal points denotes the totality of individuals with the property of being 
cardinal points. It is important to remark that, although in principle maximality covers both 
singulars and plural cases, for expository reasons related to the analysis we are about to 
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In addition to the usual motivations that are provided in favor of the 
uniqueness approach, we have another one related to the way weak deinites 
are expressed in some dialects of German. In these dialects, when a preposi-
tion precedes a deinite article (e.g. zu dem Haus ‘to the house’), the deinite 
article can contract for several reasons (e.g. zum Haus ‘to the house’) (Cie-
schinger 2006; Puig-Waldmüller 2008; Schwarz 2009). One of these reasons 
is the expression of weak deiniteness. Schwarz has noticed that if the deinite 
article is not contracted in these contexts, then the weak reading of the deinite 
is not available:
(26) Maria ging zum/zu #dem Supermarkt. (Schwarz 2009)
 Maria went to-the/to the supermarket
 ‘Maria went to the supermarket’
Interestingly, something similar happens with generic uses of deinites. The 
following sentence, which makes a statement not about a particular zebra, but 
about the kind zebra, is only acceptable if the deinite article is contracted:
(27) Am/#an dem Zebra kann man sehen, dass die Natur symmetrisch ist.   
 (Schwarz 2009)
 on-the/on the zebra can one see that the nature symmetrical is
 ‘The zebra shows us that nature is symmetrical.’
Schwarz attributes a presuppositional uniqueness-based meaning to the 
contracted form. His analysis only deals explicitly with deinites referring to 
unique ordinary individuals and he leaves for future work the analysis of gene-
ric and weak deinites. As far as we are concerned, the only two assumptions 
that are needed to extend Schwarz’s analysis to cover these cases straight-
forwardly, are, on the one hand, that both weak and generic deinites refer 
to unique kinds and, of course, that the denotation of the deinite article he 
proposes can range over kinds.
Before we move on to analyze generic and weak deinites, let us provide 
in (28) the denotation we adopt for the singular deinite article. This denotation 
corresponds to a function from properties to truth values which presupposes 
that the entity x is the unique individual of which the property P holds. Fol-
lowing Partee (1986), uniqueness is indicated by means of the iota-operator:
(28) the  = lPix.P(x)
Now, if we combine, via Function Application, the denotation of the with that 
of a common noun like balloon, which in this context denotes a property of 
explain, and because in any case we will be dealing with singular cases most of the time, we 
continue accounting for the deinite article in terms of uniqueness.
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individuals, we obtain an expression of type e corresponding to the unique 
individual that has the balloon property:
(29) a. the  = λPιx.P(x)
 b. balloon  = λx.Balloon(x)
 c. the balloon  = λPιx.P(x)  ( λx.Balloon(x) )  by FA 
   = ιx.Balloon(x)
In regular deinites like the balloon, nouns denote sets of ‘ordinary’ indivi-
duals. However, as we will see in the next section, nouns can also denote sets 
of kinds.
3. reference to kinds
Kinds can be deined as abstract objects which are representative of a 
group of individuals with similar characteristics. Since Carlson (1977), it is 
standardly assumed that NPs can refer to kinds (and subkinds) besides ordi-
nary individuals. Since then, several authors have studied how this reference 
is accomplished by different types of NPs in a diverse range of contexts (see 
Carlson 1977; Chierchia 1998; Ojeda 1991; Krifka et al. 1995; Geurts 2001; 
Cohen 2002, 2005; Dayal 2004; Krifka 2004; Katz and Zamparelli 2005; Far-
kas and de Swart 2007; Dobrovie-Sorin and Pires de Oliveira 2008; Mueller-
Reichau 2012; Borik and Espinal 2012, among many others). The following 
sentences illustrate this diversity with different types of verbal predicates and, 
crucially, with different types of kind-referring NPs (in bold letters), namely, 
bare plurals, indeinites, and deinites:
(30) a. women are good managers.
 b. Thomas Stewart had invented a clamping mop that could wring the water
  out of itself by the use of a lever.
 c. the whale eats lots of ish and krill in order to fatten up for its long trip to
  its mating grounds.
In what follows we focus on the generic deinites that (30c) illustrates, and (31) 
more extensively:
(31) a. the dutchman is a good sailor.
 b. Shockley invented the transistor.
 c. the potato genome contains 12 chromosomes and 860 million base pairs 
making it a medium-sized plant genome.
 d. Context: In the zoo.
  Sentence: Look children! This is the reticulated giraffe.
Understanding the meaning of generic deinites is essential for our purposes 
because, as we saw before, there is a parallelism between generic and weak 
deinites. This parallelism largely motivates our theory of weak deinites.
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3.1. Generic deinites and reference to kinds
Generic deinites have received much less attention than other kind-
referring expressions, in particular bare plurals. However, works like Ojeda 
(1991); Chierchia (1998); Dayal (2003, 2004, 2011, 2013); Krifka (2004); 
Beyssade (2005); Farkas and de Swart (2007); Borik and Espinal (2012) are 
examples of insightful attempts to understand the distribution and meaning 
of these constructions as well as to differentiate well enough the nature of the 
kinds they refer to from the kinds bare plurals refer to.
Following Dayal (2004); Krifka (2004); Farkas and de Swart (2007); 
Borik and Espinal (2012), we assume that the meaning of generic deinites 
results from the combination of the uniqueness-encoding deinite article plus 
nouns denoting properties of kinds, which are conceived as atomic indivi-
duals. 3 According to this analysis, the denotation of a generic deinite like the 
whale (in (30c)) corresponds to the unique kind of which the whale property 
holds (the unique member of the singleton {w}). This denotation is abbrevia-
ted with a capital letter in boldface:





   = w
As simple and intuitive as this denotation may be, there are a few things to say 
about it. The irst thing is that this denotation obviously implies that the iota-
operator that the deinite article represents can bind kind variables in addition 
to individual variables. This is an intuitive assumption as there is no reason 
why the iota operator, like the existential and universal quantiier, cannot bind 
different sorts of variables.
The second thing to say is that the adopted denotation implies that NPs 
can operate at the level of either kinds or ordinary individuals. This has been 
independently assumed to account for other phenomena apart from generic 
deinites, such as incorporation and pseudo-incorporation in a number of lan-
guages (see, for example, Dayal 2003, 2011; Espinal and McNally 2011; Mc-
Nally and Boleda 2004; Dobrovie-Sorin and Pires de Oliveira 2008). In the 
literature there exist at least three ways in which the ability of nouns to operate 
at the level of both kinds and individuals has been proposed to happen. One is 
by assuming that nouns can systematically denote both properties of ordinary 
individuals and properties of kinds. This is in line with Dayal (2004) and Far-
kas and de Swart (2007). Another possibility, proposed by Borik and Espinal 
(2012), is that nouns always denote properties of kinds and that the number 
projection (NumP) adds the individual level. The idea is that, when this pro-
3. We are aware that this analysis is not uncontroversial (see Farkas and de Swart 2007, 
for discussion). We refer the reader to other approaches to generic deinites such as Chierchia 
(1998), who derives the kind reference of generic deinites in terms of group individuals.
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jection is not present, as they claim to happen with generic deinites, the kind 
level is the only one available. The third possibility, assumed by McNally and 
Boleda (2004), is that the denotation of nouns includes at the same time both 
an individual and a kind argument. 4 To evaluate in detail the advantages of 
these three possibilities is beyond this paper. Instead, only for the sake of sim-
plicity, we adopt the irst one, namely, that nouns are ambiguous between kind-
level and object-level denotations. 5
The last thing to say about the adopted denotation for generic deinites 
has to do with the conditions under which these deinites are acceptable. It is 
well known that at least in English generic deinites are not fully productive. 
Consider the classical examples in (33), which Carlson (1977) attributes to 
Barbara Partee.
(33) a.  The Coke bottle has a long neck.
 b. # The green bottle has a long neck.
Based on these examples, Carlson proposes that generic deinites are restricted 
to designating well-established concepts. Accordingly, Coke bottles consti-
tute a well-deined concept whereas green bottles do not, and that explains the 
contrast above. Dayal (2004) claims that this explanation is not accurate given 
that contextual manipulation in principle can enable any deinite to have an 
acceptable generic interpretation. As an example, she describes the context of 
a factory that produces two kinds of bottles, a green one for medicinal purposes 
and a white one for cosmetics. In that context the deinite in (33b) would feli-
citously refer to a kind.
We believe that at a general level Carlson’s and Dayal’s ideas about 
the licensing of generic deinites are complementary rather than opposite. We 
believe that what licenses the generic reading of a deinite is the presence of 
appropriate circumstances leading to the identiication of a unique kind, maybe 
similar to what happens with regular deinites referring to unique ordinary in-
dividuals. In this view, well-establishedness is one of these circumstances en-
abling unique reference because what it does is to differentiate the kinds well 
enough, just as happens with some “universally” unique individuals (e.g. the 
moon). In the example of the Coke bottle, general world knowledge enables 
us to interpret the deinite as referring to the uniquely identiiable Coke bottle 
4. In this denotation the kind argument is related to the individual argument via 
Carlson’s (1977) realization relation, as we will discuss later on.
5. Admittedly, assuming that properties, in this case denoted by nouns in gene-
ric deinites, can hold of ordinary individuals or of kinds may represent a conceptual 
problem. Whereas it is evident that individuals can have, for instance, the property of 
being a whale, the question is in what sense kinds can also do so. Is the kind w of the 
whales also something to which the property of being a whale can apply? We leave this 
important issue for future research.
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kind. In contrast, in the example of the green bottle, an appropriate context sets 
up the unique identiiability of the kind of green bottles so that a deinite can 
pick it up. 6
There are other ways to achieve unique reference. One way is by mo-
difying the deinites with adjectives operating at the level of kinds, as in the 
Persian cat in (34a) (see McNally and Boleda 2004; Arsenijevic et al. 2010). 
However, the question then is what exactly the modiier is doing there. One 
option would be that the adjective narrows down the domain of evaluation of 
the deinite to the extent that it creates the effect of uniqueness. Intriguingly, 
as the French cat in (34b) shows, not every modiier works equally well to 
license generic deinites. This suggests that kind-level modiiers create well-
established kinds sometimes but not always. That would be the case for the 
Persian cat but not for the French cat:
(34) a.  The Persian cat is one of the most popular breeds of cats around.
 b. ? The French cat is one of the most popular breeds of cats around.
Another way to arrive at reference of a uniquely identiiable kind is by refer-
ring to natural kinds or artifacts, about which we do not typically talk as ordi-
nary individuals, like the piranha (35) or the transistor (36):
(35) The piranha is a type of freshwater ish found in the rivers of the South American 
jungles.
(36) The transistor was invented by John Bardeen.
Compare these examples with other names of other more familiar species and 
artifacts such as the cat or the bed, whose generic interpretations are less ac-
ceptable:
(37) a. ?The cat is a type of pet very popular among singles.
6. Our explanation of the bottle examples partly differs from Dayal’s explanation. The 
reason is that, in fact, we disagree with part of her proposal. According to her, generic dei-
nites refer to kinds that are atomic but also part of a taxonomy. Following this view, deinites 
can only be successfully interpreted generically when the context invokes the appropriate 
level of the taxonomy such that no subkinds of the relevant type are included. Only in this 
way can the kind referred to be unique in the context. For example, the lion can refer to the 
unique kind l only when subkinds of the species Panthera leo are not part of the domain of 
evaluation of the deinite. We see a problem with this proposal. Although it seems intuitively 
right to account for natural species, which by deinition are associated with taxonomies, the 
idea that these structures are necessary for generic readings to be licensed seems ad hoc and 
unnecessary for the bottle examples in the factory contexts. According to Dayal, what the 
factory context would be doing is to set up a taxonomy constituted by two types of bottles, 
the green one and the blue one. In that taxonomy the green bottle is a unique kind. We do not 
see why such a taxonomy would be necessary if what the context is doing in any case is to 
make the green bottle kind uniquely identiiable.
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 b. ?The bed was invented by Egyptians.
As can be seen, there is still much to investigate about generic deinites and their 
conditions of acceptability. In particular, the notion of well- establishedness 
needs further investigation given its relevance not only to the interpretation of 
generic deinites but also to that of weak deinites. For further discussion see, 
for example, Zwarts (to appear), who discusses how the identiiability of kinds 
can be analyzed in terms of frames that can be culturally and contextually 
conditioned.
3.2. Weak deinites and reference to kinds
Having discussed generic deinites, we can now proceed to determine 
the meaning of weak deinites. Our proposal is that weak deinites, just like 
generic deinites, refer to kinds. Thus, for example, the deinites the newspaper 
and the violin in sentences (38a) and (38b) refer, respectively, to the unique 
kind N and the unique kind V, as the denotations in (39) show:
(38) a. Lola is reading the newspaper.
 b. Marika played the violin.





   = n





   = v
Analyzing weak deinites as kind-referring expressions accounts for three of 
the special properties of weak deinites. First of all, it accounts for the main 
anomaly of weak deinites compared with regular deinites, namely, the pres-
ence of a deinite article despite the lack of uniqueness at the level of ordinary 
entities. With a weak deinite, what licenses the deinite article is the unique-
ness of the kind referred to.
The present proposal can also account for the restrictions on modii-
cation exempliied in (6). If weak deinites denote kinds, then the nouns hea-
ding them must also range over kinds rather than over ordinary individuals. 
Adjectives like old are predicates of individuals, which means that they are 
incompatible with kind-referring nouns. Thus, a deinite like the old hospital 
can only refer to an ordinary individual. This reasoning leads to a prediction, 
namely, that weak deinites only combine with adjectives operating at the level 
of kinds. In this case, the adjective combines with a noun ranging over kinds, 
generating an NP that also denotes the singleton set of kinds from which the 
deinite article can pick its unique member. Following McNally and Boleda 
(2004), an example of this type of adjective would be psychiatric. The idea 
is that in a deinite like the psychiatric hospital, the noun hospital refers to 
a set of hospital kinds, which the adjective takes and maps to the singleton 
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set of psychiatric hospital kinds. The prediction that weak deinites are only 
able to combine with kind-level adjectives is conirmed by the results of some 
experiments reported in Aguilar-Guevara and Schulpen (to appear). These 
experiments show that weak deinites modiied by kind-level adjectives in VP- 
ellipsis sentences allow sloppy readings signiicantly more than regular dei-
nites and weak deinites modiied by object-level adjectives.
Interestingly, the proposal that weak deinites, just like generic dei-
nites, refer to unique kinds explains the resemblance between the two types 
of phrases. However, it also leads us to the observation of one initial problem 
with the proposal. Compare the weak deinite sentences in (38) with the fol-
lowing generic sentences:
(40) a. The newspaper is a rich source of information.
 b. The violin in its present form emerged in the early 16th century in Northern 
Italy.
The generic sentences in (40) contain the (arguably) kind-level predicates 
source of information and emerge which as such can straightforwardly apply 
to the kinds referred to by the generic deinites. In contrast, the weak deinite 
sentences in (38) contain the object-level predicates (i.e. individual-level or 
stage-level predicates) read and play, which as such cannot apply to kinds.
This problem brings us to the next step of our analysis, namely, to de-
termine how the kinds denoted by weak deinites can be realized in order to 
combine with object-level predicates.
4. kinds realized
Every semantic analysis that makes use of the notion of kinds also 
needs to consider how these kinds are instantiated by particular individuals. In 
the case of weak deinites this is necessary because a sentence like Lola took 
the train in the end predicates about an event in which Lola directly interacts 
with (at least) one individual of the train kind rather than with the kind itself, 
which is an abstract entity. Following Carlson (1977), we assume that this 
instantiation of kinds occurs via the realization relation R, which relates indi-
viduals and the kinds they are realizations of:
(41) Realization Relation
 R(a, a) if the object a instantiates the kind a.
Thus, if t is the train kind, then R(a, t) means that the individual a is a reali-
zation of that kind, i.e. a train. Crucially, this kind can be instantiated not just 
by an entity but also by a sum of entities. So, in the case of the kind t, not only 
is every individual train a realization of t, but also every plural sum of trains. 
This makes it possible for sentence (42) to refer to a situation in which Lola ac-
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tually took two trains to go to Nijmegen from Amsterdam. Even though there 
is a plurality of trains at the lower level of realizations, there is still uniqueness 
at the higher level of kinds:
(42)  Lola took the train from Amsterdam to Nijmegen.
Having the realization relation at our disposal, it is possible to be more speciic 
about the interpretation of generic deinites in sentences in which the deinites 
combine with an object-level predicates:
(43) a. The violin has no frets to stop the strings.
 b. The newspaper comes in a plastic bag when it rains.
Following Krifka et al. (1995), we can say that sentence (43a) conveys a gene-
ralization about individuals that are realizations of the violin kind, namely, that 
these individuals have no frets to stop their strings. Likewise, sentence (43b) 
conveys a generalization about both individuals that are realizations of the 
newspaper kind, and the situations in which these realizations come and it rains. 
The generalization in this case is that these realizations come in a plastic bag.
To represent the meaning of both (43a) and (43b), we make use of the 
generic operator GEN, conceived as a sort of invisible adverbial quantiier 
close in meaning to usually. Again, following Krifka et al., we adopt the sim-
pliied representation of GEN in (44). According to this, GEN can range over 



















In the partial semantic representation of (43a) given in (45), GEN takes reali-
zations of the violin kind as its restrictor and the individuals that have no frets 
to stop their strings as its matrix. Likewise, in the representation of (43b) given 
in (46), realizations of the newspaper kind as well as situations in which they 
come and it rains are part of the restrictor, and individuals that come in a plastic 
bag are part of the matrix:
(45)  a. The violin has no frets to stop the strings.






 has no frets to stop the strings)
(46)  a. The newspaper comes in a plastic bag when it rains.




, n) ^ it rains in s ^ xi comes in s; xi comes in a plastic 
bag in s)
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5. The logical form for weak deinite sentences
Let us now combine the insights from Sections 3 and 4 to develop a 
semantic representation of sentences with weak deinites. This proposal is 
partly inspired by the account that Dayal (2003); Dayal (2011) and Espinal and 
McNally (2011) provide for sentences with bare singulars in Hindi and in Spa-
nish and Catalan, respectively. Both Dayal and Espinal and McNally treat bare 
singulars as cases of pseudo-incorporation, which is the phenomenon in which 
singular bare nouns occurring in internal argument position share semantic 
properties with syntactically incorporated nouns (e.g. obligatory narrow scope, 
inability to introduce discourse referents, number neutrality and meaning en-
richment) but, at the same time, behave syntactically more freely than these 
other nouns (e.g. they do not necessarily occur in strict adjacency to the verb, 
they can be marked for case, the verb can show agreement with the noun, and 
certain types of modiication may be allowed). Incorporation and pseudo-in-
corporation have been studied by several authors in different languages (e.g. 
Baker 1988; van Geenhoven 1998; Carlson 2006; Chung and Ladusaw 2004; 
Dayal 2003, 2011; Farkas and de Swart 2003; Espinal and McNally 2011; 
Massam 2001; Mithun 1984; Sadock 1980; Stvan 2009; Vázquez-Rojas Mal-
donado 2009). The analyses of Dayal and Espinal and McNally are both based 
on the idea that bare singulars denote properties instead of entities. As such, 
they function as verb modiiers. The verbs, on the other hand, have their inter-
nal argument suppressed by means of a mechanism which is different for each 
approach. The special semantics of bare singulars together with the conditions 
under which the suppression of the internal argument takes place explain the 
special properties of bare singulars.
Given that weak deinites share a number of properties with incorpo-
rated bare singulars, it seems reasonable to treat weak deinites as cases of 
pseudo-incorporation. This has been suggested by Carlson (2006) and worked 
out in detail by Schwarz (to appear). However, the account of weak deinite 
sentences we present here does not involve this process. One important reason 
why we do not pursue a pseudo-incorporation analysis is that this would not 
straightforwardly allow us to attribute a meaningful role to the presence of 
the deinite article in weak deinites. Another reason is that this analysis does 
not permit us to capture the parallelism between generic deinites and weak 
deinites. See Aguilar-Guevara (2014) for a more extended argument against a 
pseudo-incorporation analysis. 
Returning to the logical form of weak deinite sentences, consider again 
the example of Lola reading the newspaper, repeated in (47). Thinking in Neo-
Davidsonian terms, we can say that this sentence expresses that Lola was in-
volved in a reading event with at least one instantiation of the newspaper kind. 
This could be represented in either of the two ways shown in (47a) and (47b). 
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Notice that following Parsons (1990), we assume that verbs are predicates over 
events and thematic roles are functions from events to participants (atoms or 
sums). For the sake of simplicity, we are omitting tense and aspect information.
(47)  Lola read the newspaper.
 a. ∃e[Read(e) ^ Ag(e) = lola ^ R(Th(e), n)]
 b. ∃e∃x
i
 [Read(e) ^ Ag(e) = lola ^ Th(e) = xi ^ R(xi, n)]
Both (47a) and (47b) correspond to sets of reading events of which Lola is the 
agent, and instantiations of the newspaper kind are the theme. 7 The difference 
between them is that (47a), in contrast with (47b), avoids existential quantiica-
tion over realizations of the newspaper kind by using the functional expression 
Th(e) directly as the irst argument of the realization relation. It is commonly 
assumed that the presence of existential quantiiers over individuals typically 
provides for the establishment of referents into the discourse (Heim 1982; Kamp 
1981; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1990, 1991). Espinal and McNally (2011) make 
direct use of Th(e) as the irst argument of the realization relation in order to 
avoid this kind of quantiication and then be consistent with the deicient refe-
rential status of bare singular nouns in Spanish. The same strategy is adopted in 
(47a) predicting then that weak deinites do not set up discourse referents at the 
individual level. In contrast, (47b) predicts that weak deinites are referential in 
this sense. Thus, even though truth-conditionally equivalent, the representations 
in (47a) and (47b) have different discourse properties assuming that existen-
tial quantiiers normally introduce discourse referents. As the example in (13) 
shows, the prediction that weak deinites are discourse-referentially defective is 
borne out. Accordingly, we opt for the type of logical form in (1a).
Two more aspects of weak deinites can be accounted for due to another 
characteristic of the adopted logical form. These aspects are sloppy readings in 
VP ellipsis constructions, and narrow scope interpretations in sentences with 
quantiied expressions. The relevant characteristic of the logical form is that 
the individual realizations of the kinds are tied to the event variable in a local 
way. As the sentence and the logical form in (48) show, sloppy identity in VP 
ellipsis occurs because the Th function is local to each of the two propositions 
expressed in this sentence and because each one has its own existential event 
quantiier: 
(48) a. Lola read the newspaper and Alice did too.
 b. ∃e[Read(e) ^ R(Th(e), h) ^ Ag(e) = lola] ^ ∃e’[Read(e) ^
  R(Th(e’), h) ^ Ag(e’) = alice]
7. The sets of events that both logical forms represent can be more easily seen if the 
existential quantiier over events is replaced by a lambda operator:
 (1) a. λe[Read(e) ^ Ag(e) = lola ^ R(Th(e), n)]
  b. λe∃x
i
 [Read(e) ^ Ag(e) = lola ^ Th(e) = xi ^ R(xi, n)]
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Similarly, the narrow scope effect is due to the event quantiier always having 
narrow scope with respect to the scope bearing operator and the thematic role 
being dependent upon the event variable: 
(49)  a. Every librarian read the newspaper.
 b. ∀y[Librarian(y) → ∃e[Read(e) ^ R(Th(e), n) ^ Ag(e) = y]]
Despite the advantages of the logical forms we are attributing to sentences with 
weak deinites, these formulas still do not sufice to account for the complete 
interpretation of the sentences. In particular, these logical forms still do not 
capture meaning enrichments. This leads us to the next step of our analysis.
6. stereotypical usages
Sentence (50) not only expresses that there was an event in which Alice 
goes to a location that qualiies as a hospital. It also expresses that in this event 
the typical purpose of hospitals, namely, to provide medical services, was ful-
illed. Likewise, the sentence in (51) not only expresses that there was an event 
in which Alice examines an object that is classiied as a calendar. Furthermore, 
it conveys that she did so to beneit from the stereotypical purpose of a calen-
dar, namely, to provide information regarding the availability of a person or an 
institution in the days, weeks, and months of a particular year:
(50) Alice went to the hospital = Alice went to a hospital + to get medical services.
(51) Lola checked the calendar = Lola checked a calendar + to check availability.
In general we can say that sentences with weak deinites not only predicate 
about an event in which an agent interacts with instantiations of a kind. 
Crucially, these events involve the most typical purpose associated with the 
kind. In other words, the event predicated about is part of the most typical 
circumstances under which objects of a particular kind are used. We call 
these circumstances stereotypical usages (SUs). Aguilar-Guevara (2014) 
characterizes SUs in detail and motivates their participation in the interpre-
tation of weak deinites based on the lexical semantics of the nouns heading 
them. What is relevant for now is that, in order to capture SUs formally, we 
need to assume an additional restriction on the events quantiied over. We 
do so by means of the Stereotypical Usage Relation U, which is deined as 
follows.
(52) Stereotypical Usage Relation
 U(e, k) if the event e is a stereotypical usage of the kind k.
Through the relation U, a kind k is associated with the set of events in which 
its instantiations function in ways that are stereotypical for k. Notice two 
relevant properties of this predicate. First, the U predicate relates stereoty-
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pical events with kinds rather than with ordinary individuals. This follows 
the assumption that stereotypes are constructed about types of objects rather 
than about the objects themselves (Aguilar-Guevara 2014). Second, incor-
porating the U predicate into the logical form of weak deinite sentences 
has as a consequence that the speciication this predicate makes (i.e. that 
the events quantiied over correspond to SUs of a kind) is part of the truth-
conditional meaning of the sentences rather than a conversational implica-
ture or a presupposition. Aguilar-Guevara and Schulpen (2011) and Agui-
lar-Guevara (2013) provide empirical evidence in favor of this treatment. 
They show that, unlike other non-asserted meanings, the enriched meanings 
weak deinite sentences display are, among other things, non-defeasible and 
at-issue meanings. 
Once we have the U predicate at our disposal, then it is possible to 
provide complete analyses of weak deinite sentences. Thus, for example, 
the sentence about Lola checking the calendar (repeated in (53a) and trans-
lated in (53b)) denotes a non-empty set of events of checking in which the 
agent is Lola and the theme is a realization of the calendar kind, such that 
this set of events is part of the set of events in which calendars are used in 
ways that are stereotypical for their kind. Similarly, the sentence about Alice 
going to the hospital (repeated in (54a) and translated in (54b)) denotes 
a non-empty set of events of goal-directed motion in which the agent is 
Alice and the location is a realization of the hospital kind, such that in those 
events the hospital kind is fulilling its stereotypical function. In relation to 
sentence (54), we must acknowledge that for convenience we have made 
two simpliications in the analysis. First, the combination go to is analyzed 
as one event predicate. Second, stereotypicality usages are directly connec-
ted to this event, although strictly speaking they are connected to the event 
of being at the hospital.
(53) a.  Lola checked the calendar.
 b.  ∃e[Checked(e) ^ Ag(e) = lola ^ R(Th(e), c) ^ U(e, C)]
(54) a.  Alice went to the hospital.
 b. ∃e[Go-to(e) ^ Ag(e) = alice ^ R(Loc(e), h) ^ U(e, h)]
The inclusion of U into the logical form of weak deinite sentences is advanta-
geous not only because it captures the meaning enrichment that the sentences 
display. In addition, it leads us to a straightforward explanation of the lexical 
restrictions weak deinites are subject to. Recall that, as the examples in (55) 
compared to (53a) show, not every noun can occur in a weak deinite and that 
not every verb can govern a weak deinite: 
(55) a. Lola read #the calendar.
 b. Lola checked #the book.
 c. Lola read #the book.
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To facilitate our explanation, we represent graphically the logical form of the 
sentence about Lola checking the calendar. Figure 1 shows that this logical 
form corresponds to a non-empty intersection of the set of events of checking, 
the set of events in which Lola is the agent, the set of events in which the theme 
is the realization of the calendar kind, and the set of SUs associated with that 
kind. This is in the spirit of Neo-Davidsonian event semantics, that analyzes 
sentences as a conjunction of conditions on the event variable.
Figure 1: Lola checked the calendar.
Let us then focus on the intersection between the set of events λe.V(e) that 
corresponds to the verb to check, i.e. λeCheck(e), and the set of events 
λe.U(e,k) associated with the SUs of the calendar kind, i.e. λe.U(e,c). 
Our proposal is that it is precisely the existence of the intersection between 
λe.V(e) and λe.U(e,k) which ultimately triggers the weak reading of a kind-
referring deinite. Compare the interaction between these two sets in to 
check the calendar (in Figure 2a) with the interaction between these two 
sets in to read #the calendar (in Figure 2b). 8 In this case, the verb to check is 
replaced by to read, which does not allow its deinite object to be interpreted 
weakly. Consistent with our proposal, the idea is that here λe.U(e,k) and 
λe.V(e) do not intersect, as reading is not part of the SUs of calendars. Ana-
logously, we could say that the VP to check #the book, which substitutes the 
noun calendar by book, does not trigger any weak reading because the set 
of events of checking does not intersect the set of SUs attributed to the book 
kind. However, there is a potential problem with this argument, namely, that 
the VP to read the book does not trigger any weak reading either despite 
8. In the igures, the lambda operator is omitted for convenience.
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the fact that books are made for reading. As reading is probably part of 
the typical actions associated with books, it doesn’t seem to be intuitive to 
attribute the absence of weak readings to an empty intersection of λe.U(e,k) 
and λe.V(e). That is why in this case, we need to assume that the book kind 
is simply not associated with any SU at all (see Figures 2c and 2d). This 
assumption, related to the fact that concepts like book are too general to be 
identiied with stereotypes, is defended in Aguilar-Guevara (2014). Also, 
see Zwarts (2013) for a discussion of the lexical restrictions of nouns in 
weak deinites in the context of frames.
Figure 2: Interaction between the sets U and V in different sentences.
7. Combining verbs with weak deinites
Let us now return to the compositional structure of sentences with weak 
deinites. We start by deriving the meaning of VPs containing weak deinites. 
We adopt Kratzer’s (1996) assumptions that external arguments are introduced 
independently and not as part of the lexical semantics of verbs, and that the 
existential quantiier over events is introduced by the tense-aspect system. In 
other words, the subject can be treated as simply adding a thematic condition 
on the event. We make this assumption primarily because it makes the analysis 
of the verb a bit easier. Thus, the meaning of weak deinite VPs can be illus-
trated as follows:
(56) a. read the newspaper  =  λe[Read(e) ^ R(Th(e), n) ^ U(e, n)]
 b. go to the hospital  =  λe[Go-to(e) ^ R(Loc(e), h) ^ U(e, h)]





U(e,C) Check(e) Read(e) U(e,C) 
Read(e) U(e,B) U(e,B) Check(e) 
(c) to check #the book (d) to read #the book 
(b) to read #the calendar (a) to check the calendar 
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(57) a. read   = λx
k
λe[Read(e) ^ R(Th(e), xk) ^ U(e, xk)]
 b. go-to   = λx
k
λe[Go-to(e) ^ R(Loc(e), xk) ^ U(e, xk)]
What we have in (57a) and (57b) are enriched kind-level denotations of the 
verbs to read and to go to. We propose that these meanings are derived from 
the ordinary object-level meaning of verbs by means of a lexical rule, which 
is deined as follows:
(58) Kind Lifting Rule
 If V is a transitive verb (or verb-preposition combination) with an internal argu-
ment Arg and V has the meaning λx
i
λe[V(e) ^ Arg(e) = xi], then V also has the 
meaning λx
k
λe[V(e) ^ R(Arg(e), xk) ^ U(e, xk)].
This lexical rule can be seen as a general type-shift function (or rather, sort-
shift function) à la Partee (1986). This implies that this rule is a productive 
mechanism of generation of predicates, that is to say, in principle it can apply 
to any verb and verb-preposition combination yielding a function that can 
take any atomic kind. However, this does not mean that the occurrence of 
weak deinites is predicted to be productive. As we have seen in the previous 
section, two circumstances must co-occur in order for the lifted enriched pre-
dicates to trigger weak deinite readings. The irst one is that the predicate 
applies to a kind associated with SUs. The second circumstance is that the set 
of events corresponding to SUs and to the predicate intersect. Only if these 
two circumstances coincide do weak deinite readings emerge. To capture the 
conluence of these circumstances, we propose the following condition of 
applicability of KLR.
(59) Condition of applicability of the KLR
 A verb or verb-preposition combination V with the meaning λx
i
λe[V(e) ̂  Arg(e) 
= x
i
] can also get the meaning λx
k
λe[V(e) ^ R(Arg(e), xk) ^ U(e, xk)] and then 
combine with a DP referring to an atomic kind k iff λeV(e) ∩ λeU(e, k) ≠∅.
8. conclusion
We have proposed that weak deinites refer to kinds which combine with 
object-level predicates by means of the KLR. This lexical rule lifts object-level 
predicates to kind-level predicates, indicates that kinds the lifted predicates 
combine with are instantiated via the realization relation R, and incorporates 
the relation U into the denotation of the lifted predicates, which corresponds to 
stereotypical usages of kinds. 
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8.1. virtues of the proposal
Let us now summarize how this proposal accounts for the properties of 
weak deinites listed in Section 1. First of all, the assumption that a weak dei-
nite is an ordinary deinite, but referring to kinds, explains both the presence of 
the deinite article in these constructions and the lack of the uniqueness pres-
upposition at the level of ordinary individuals. Given that uniqueness applies at 
the level of kinds and given that instantiations of kinds can be entities or sums, 
sentences with weak deinites are felicitous in contexts where more than one 
entity satisies their descriptive content (1). The kind-referring nature of weak 
deinites also explains the resemblance between these and generic deinites (9). 
Also, this kind-referring nature explains why modiiers operating at the level 
of individuals are incompatible with weak readings (6a), and predicts that only 
kind-level modiiers are able to maintain these readings (6b). The logical form 
attributed to sentences with weak deinites, which does not involve existen-
tial quantiication over individuals, is consistent with the incapability of weak 
deinites to establish discourse referents (13). Sloppy identity in VP ellipsis is 
due to the thematic role being speciic for each event in this kind of representa-
tion (2). Narrow scope is due to the same reason, because the event quantiier 
has narrow scope with respect to scope bearing operators (3). The fact that 
weak readings are due to the application of the KLR accounts for the fact 
that weak deinites typically occur as objects and not as subjects (8) because 
this rule affects internal arguments which typically correspond to objects and 
not to subjects. The presence of the U predicate that the KLR incorporates 
into the lifted predicates, which relates SUs to kinds, captures the enriched 
meaning of the sentences with weak deinites (12). The association with SUs 
also accounts for the lexical restrictions of these deinites: only certain nouns 
that support stereotypical usage patterns trigger weak readings (4). Likewise, 
only verbs and verb-preposition combinations associated with these patterns 
support weak readings (5).
The virtues of the present analysis can be summarized in three points. 
First of all, this analysis takes a irst serious step towards an analysis of ill-
understood weak deinites, opening up new ways of looking at the role of the 
functional aspect of the meaning of nouns, kind reference, and the use of the 
deinite article. Second, it accounts for the exceptional properties of weak dei-
nites with mechanisms well motivated in the literature such as reference to 
kinds, the realization relation, type shifts and the iota-operator. Third, it treats 
deinite generics and weak deinites as different faces of the same phenome-
non, which is empirically and methodologically satisfactory.
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8.2. open questions
Our theory is challenged by a number of issues. The irst one is the 
existence of plural weak deinites, which the following examples illustrate: 
(60) a. Alice went to the mountains.
 b. Joan watered the plants.
 c. I am doing the dishes.
Interestingly, some plural generic deinites are also possible in English: 
(61) The mountains are the perfect place to get away from the hustle and bustle of 
the city.
Plura weak and generic deinites are problematic for our analysis because plu-
rality is in principle incompatible with the atomic nature of the kinds that both 
types of deinites are supposed to refer to. One alternative to explain these cases 
would be to assume that the nouns in these deinites are a sort of pluralia tan-
tum nouns which do not compositionally relate to their singular counterparts. 
In other words, these nouns, instead of just referring to the sums of atomic 
individuals that their singular counterparts refer to, designate other individuals 
which certainly involve plurality but more as happens with collective nouns. 
Accordingly, the plural noun mountains does not refer to a sum of mountains 
but rather to a collection which, among other complications, not only includes 
mountains but also anything in the surface between the mountains (i.e. valleys 
and lakes). 
One potential problem with this solution is that the plural nouns occur-
ring in weak deinites differ from classical examples of pluralia tantum such 
as scissors. First, the singular versions of these nouns, unlike those of plurals 
like mountains, are ill-formed (compare *scissor with mountain). Second, in 
principle pluralia tantum nouns like scissors can be used to refer both to ordi-
nary individuals (62a) and to kinds (62b). However, in the case of mountains 
we would need to assume that the pluralia tantum reading only emerges when 
the nouns operate at the level of kinds. 
(62) a. I love the new scissors I bought from your website.
 b. The scissors is one of the most ingenious and useful tools ever devised.
We leave for future research the resolution of these and other problems that 
treating plural nouns heading generic and weak deinites as pluralia tantum 
nouns may bring along. 
A second challenge for our theory is the fact that, although weak deinites 
typically occur as objects of episodic sentences, a few deinites in subject posi-
tion seem to receive weak readings as well. Consider the following examples: 
(63)  a. I used to hear the newspaper arrive in the wee hours of the morning.
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 b. the train passes through here twice daily and four times on weekends.
 c. I had the plumber repair the tank.
 d. Despite the heavy rain, the window was open and the radio was playing 
loudly.
If we accept that the cases above are examples of weak deinites, then they 
also represent a problem for our theory. Recall that, according to it, the emer-
gence of weak readings depends on object-level predicates being transformed 
into kind-level predicates. These predicates are enriched with the U relation, 
which relates the internal argument of the predicate, a kind, with the set of 
events that are stereotypical for the kind. Weak deinites in subject position in 
principle correspond to external arguments and as such they cannot depend on 
the KLR to generate the weak reading because external arguments are not part 
of the lexical meaning of the verb. To account for these potential cases, one 
alternative would be to treat weak deinites in subject position as arguments 
of unacusative verbs, which, although internal, occupy the subject position 
for syntactic reasons (Perlmutter 1978; Burzio 1986; Levin and Hovav 1995). 
That option would straightforwardly work for verbs like to arrive whose argu-
ment looks more like a theme than like an agent. However, to treat verbs like to 
repair, whose argument is agentive, as cases of unaccusativity is challenging. 
We leave this issue for further research. 
A third problem for our approach are weak deinites in non-argumental 
prepositional phrases, like those illustrated in (64). These cases are a problem 
because the KLR, as stated in (58), applies to verbs and verb-preposition com-
binations only.
(64) a. She juggles writing stories for children with writing articles about ladies 
who didn’t realize they were pregnant until they gave birth in the super-
market.
 b. There hasn’t been pop excitement like it since Duran Duran and Spandau 
Ballet bumped into each other in the hairdresser back in 1984.
 c. The other day a young high school couple broke up at the library.
To account for these cases, one solution would be to extend the applicability of 
the KLR to these prepositions. One problem with working out this extension 
is that, as the application of the KLR involves the incorporation of the U pre-
dicate, it would be necessary to assume that these prepositions, just like verbs, 
include an event argument in their lexical semantics. Such an assumption is 
not well-established and therefore it would be necessary to substantiate it in 
further research. 
Apart from the challenges just mentioned, our theory brings along a 
number of questions that we would like to answer in future work. One of them 
has to do with the resemblance between weak deinites and the bare singular 
nominals mentioned before. How can we account for the cross-linguistic com-
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plementary distribution between both types of expressions?  Are these expres-
sions kind denoting expressions as well, as Le Bruyn et al. (2011) suggest? If 
so, how should we then account for the absence of the deinite article?
Another question has to do with the possible scope of our analysis. In 
principle we have aimed to account for the weak deinites described by  Carlson 
and Sussman (2005) only. However, we wonder whether we could extend the 
analysis to other phenomena of weak deiniteness such as possessive and rela-
tional weak deinites (e.g. the corner of a busy intersection) (Guéron 1983; 
Vergnaud and Zubizarreta 1992; Ojeda 1993; Poesio 1994; Barker 2005; Le 
Bruyn to appear). How fruitful would it be to treat these deinites as kind refer-
ring expressions? Would that treatment be a better alternative for what other 
theories have already proposed? If so, how should we cope with the fact that 
possessive weak deinites do not share some of the properties of weak dei-
nites, like the semantic enrichment and the lexical restrictions?
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résumé
Cet article présente une analyse des déinis faibles (comme répondre au 
téléphone) introduits par Carlson et Sussman (2005). On y défend l’idée que les 
déinis faibles font référence à des espèces, qui s’instancient dans des individus 
ordinaires quand ils se combinent avec des prédicats de type object-level. Cette 
composition est rendue possible par une règle lexicale qui change les prédicats 
de type object-level en prédicats de type kind-level et qui incorpore à leur 
dénotation un prédicat relétant les usages stéréotypiques de ces espèces. Cette 
analyse permet de rendre compte de la plupart des propriétés caractéristiques 
des déinis faibles.
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